1. Introduction and Presentation of the Factual Background

1.1 Presentation of the Case and Legal Background

1.1.1 John Doe is an entrepreneur, manager of a Telegram community, and capital-market investor who regularly, continuously, and diligently publishes written posts, in-depth financial analyses, and unique geopolitical reviews of his own authorship. The content is written by him independently, with substantial investment of time, professional knowledge, and personal skill in formulating the material.

1.1.2 Richard Roe, who manages a competing Telegram channel on the same topics, systematically and partially publishes entire passages from John Doe’s posts in his channel. These publications are carried out by absolute word-for-word or near-word-for-word copying (copy-paste) of John Doe’s formulations, without obtaining his permission and without providing any credit or attribution to the original creator.

1.1.3 This legal opinion is intended to examine John Doe’s rights in this factual scenario, through analysis of current Israeli law and case law, and to draw the clear boundary between an idea permissible for use and a protected expression whose copying constitutes grounds for a broad civil legal claim.

2. Threshold Requirements for Copyright Protection of Digital Posts

2.1 Classification of Posts as “Literary Work”

2.1.1 The Copyright Act, 5768-2007 (hereinafter: “the Act”) defines “literary work” in Section 1 broadly and flexibly, including “inter alia a work expressed in writing.” The Act does not impose a defined qualitative, literary, or artistic threshold, and does not examine the aesthetic value of the work. Any written text, from a thick volume to an opinion piece, post, or short online analysis, falls under the definition of “literary work” by virtue of being expressed in writing.

2.1.2 In the guiding case law, the definition of literary work was incorporated in accordance with the well-known British test from Exxon Corporation v. Exxon Insurance Consultants, where it was held that a literary work is one intended “to convey information, instruction or pleasure in print.” John Doe’s posts, which analyze the capital market and the geopolitical arena and provide essential information to his readers, manifestly fulfill this purpose.

2.2 Originality and Creativity in Written Expression

2.2.1 In order to enjoy copyright protection, the work must be “original,” as required by Section 4 of the Act. In the leading judgment in Interlogo (CA 513/89 Interlogo v. Exin-Lines), President Meir Shamgar held that the originality requirement comprises two principal components: first, the “source test”—that the work was created independently by the author and not copied from another; second, the “creativity test”—requiring a minimal level of creativity, investment of human resources based on skill, choice, thought, or human effort that is not merely technical.

2.2.2 In a later case, in the seminal judgment Yehieli v. Tsezana (TA 21235-12-13), the District Court addressed the deep connection between creator and creation and defined it in such poetic terms: “an element of my soul always remains in one of my creations.” John Doe’s investment analyses and geopolitical reviews, which were composed by him independently and incorporated independent choice, filtering, and shaping of words and analyses, meet this threshold of originality and creativity with distinction.

2.3 Fixation Requirement in the Digital Era

2.3.1 Copyright does not require formal registration in Israel, but it must assume a concrete physical or digital form, known as the “fixation” requirement. Writing the posts on the Telegram network and publishing them in the group constitutes full fixation. The files are stored on the platform’s cloud servers and on the memory of the computers and phones of users who read the publication.

2.3.2 This rule is well anchored in Israeli case law (see, for example, the judgment in Burbank Animation Studios v. Classiclet and the claim in Perahi v. Perahi Kfar Gordon), where it was held that uploading a work, photograph, or text to a website or digital network constitutes tangible and sufficient fixation, giving rise to the commencement of legal protection of the work.

3. Distinction Between Idea and Expression – Boundaries of Legal Protection

3.1 Principle of the Idea-Expression Dichotomy

3.1.1 One of the most important cornerstones of intellectual property is that copyright protects the **expression** of the work, but does not grant a monopoly over the **idea** behind it. This principle, now anchored in Section 5 of the Copyright Act, provides that copyright protection shall not apply to ideas, processes, methods of operation, mathematical concepts, facts, data, or news of the day, but only to the manner of their expression.

3.1.2 The purpose of this distinction is to preserve a vital balance: to provide economic incentive to the creator for his unique expression on the one hand, and on the other hand to prevent the expropriation of ideas and public information assets, so that they remain “free as the air to common use” (as Justice Louis Brandeis defined it in the famous case International News Service v. Associated Press).

3.2 Application of the Distinction to John Doe’s Matter

3.2.1 Examination of the present case clarifies that Richard Roe—or any other user on the network—is entirely permitted to make use of John Doe’s **ideas**, the economic data he presents, or the geopolitical facts he describes. This factual information is in the public domain. Richard Roe is permitted to write his own independent post, analyzing the same markets and the same stocks, and reaching conclusions entirely identical to those of John Doe.

3.2.2 However, Richard Roe **is not permitted to copy John Doe’s specific expression**. The unique formulations, the construction of sentences, turns of phrase, the internal structure of the review, and the manner in which the data were presented and styled—all of these constitute the protected “expression.” “Word-for-word” or “near-word-for-word” copying of the written formulation constitutes a direct invasion of the protected expression layer and is defined as a manifest infringement of copyright.

4. Doctrine of Taking a “Substantial Part” and Infringement of the Right of Reproduction

4.1 The Qualitative Test for Determining Substantiality of Copying

4.1.1 Section 11 of the Act grants the creator the exclusive right to perform certain acts in the work, foremost among them reproduction. Section 11 clarifies that this right refers to the work in its entirety or to a **”substantial part”** thereof. In the leading judgment CA 23/81 Harshko v. Orbach, it was unequivocally held that the question of the existence of copying of a substantial part is examined according to a **qualitative and not quantitative measure**.

4.1.2 As extensively ruled by the Supreme Court in Mifal HaPayis v. The Roy Export Establishment Company (CA 8393/96, the Charlie Chaplin films case), copying of short but central segments (such as ninety-second film clips from a full-length film) constitutes taking of a highly substantial part, since the copied portions represent the creative heart and the “soul” of the work. The defendant in that case could not defend himself by arguing that he copied a quantitatively small part, since the quality of the part taken was decisive.

4.1.3 Similarly, in CA 9248/05 Matan Y. Communication Systems v. Miltel Communications, it was held that when a person copied a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work, he cannot defend himself by arguing that the copied part was incorporated into a later and broader work of his own. The test focuses on the expression taken from the source, not on additions made by the infringer.

4.2 Partial and Systematic Word-for-Word Copying as Infringement

4.2.1 Richard Roe publishes John Doe’s content in his channel “partially.” Ostensibly, Richard Roe might argue in his defense that since he did not copy the entire post, there is no infringement. However, application of the qualitative test established in Harshko and in the Charlie Chaplin case removes the ground from under this defense.

4.2.2 Since Richard Roe copies John Doe’s analyses “word for word,” he is taking entire paragraphs, professional formulations, and explanations that constitute the core of John Doe’s value and creativity. Taking a word-for-word analytical paragraph, even if it constitutes only 20% or 30% of the entire post, is considered taking a substantial and qualitative part of the written work, and therefore constitutes **direct and complete infringement of the right of reproduction** under Section 11(1) of the Act.

5. Complex Aspects in Technology and Social Networks

5.1 Absence of “Implied License” for Commercial Copying

5.1.1 The Telegram platform is a digital communications network operating under technological laws and social contracts. At times, an argument is raised that the very act of publishing materials on an open online platform creates an “implied license” for other users to use the content and redistribute it, particularly for the purpose of sharing information.

5.1.2 However, in the third edition of the book “Copyright” (Greenman, 2023), it is clarified that a careful distinction must be made between use of the built-in tools of social networks (such as the “Forward” function on Telegram or “Share” on Facebook, which preserve the author’s name, the original context, and direct reference to his group) and **independent physical copying (copy-paste) of texts** and presenting them in another channel as if they were created by their new publisher.

5.1.3 Richard Roe’s “copy-paste” action appropriates John Doe’s exclusive labor, disconnects readers from the source, and builds an audience for Richard Roe’s channel at the expense of John Doe’s work. Such use does not enjoy any implied license, contradicts basic principles of good faith, and constitutes theft of intellectual property for all intents and purposes.

5.2 Infringement of the Moral Right of Attribution (Credit)

5.2.1 Section 45 of the Act anchors the creator’s right to a “moral right” in his work, which stands independently of his economic rights. This right, based on the European-continental rationale that the work is an extension of the creator’s personality, includes two principal rights: the right of attribution (the right to receive credit) and the right to integrity of the work.

5.2.2 Section 46(1) of the Act provides that the right of attribution requires that the creator’s name be associated with his work “to the extent and in the manner appropriate in the circumstances.” Copying of the posts by Richard Roe, while completely omitting John Doe’s name and presenting the content in a competing channel without any attribution, constitutes **an independent and severe infringement of the moral right of attribution** (see the ruling in Qimron v. Eisenman, CA 2790/93, where the Supreme Court awarded substantial damages for failure to provide credit despite investment of complex work).

6. Legal Remedies and Damages Without Proof of Harm

6.1 Statutory Damages Under Section 56 of the Act

6.1.1 Section 56(a) of the Copyright Act grants the court broad authority to award the plaintiff, for each copyright infringement, damages without proof of harm in an amount of **between NIS 10,000 and NIS 100,000**.

6.1.2 Section 56(b) of the Act instructs the court to consider several criteria in determining the amount of damages, including: the scope, duration, and severity of the infringement; the defendant’s conduct and good faith; the actual damage caused to the plaintiff and the profit derived by the defendant by estimation; and the nature of the infringing activity.

6.1.3 Israeli case law has repeatedly held that **infringements carried out on the internet must be viewed with particular severity** (see in this regard CA 591/88 Sagi v. Corporation, as well as TA Bloomberg Inc. v. United C., and TA Landau v. Content and Training Publishing Ltd.). This severity stems from the unbearable ease of performing copying in the digital space and the enormous potential damage created by broad viral distribution. Richard Roe, who acts in commercial bad faith and exploits John Doe’s professional work for the purpose of developing his channel, may owe highly substantial statutory damages for each separately copied post (or as part of a series of infringements defined as “one course of conduct,” depending on the circumstances to be examined in court).

6.2 Injunctions and Removal of Infringing Materials

6.2.1 Section 53 of the Act grants the plaintiff the right to apply to the court with a demand to obtain an injunction (temporary or permanent) that will order Richard Roe to immediately remove all infringing content from his Telegram channel, and will absolutely prohibit him from performing any future copying of posts belonging to John Doe.

6.2.2 In considering the granting of a temporary injunction, the court will weigh the “balance of convenience” and the prospects of the claim. Since the copying here is done word for word, the prospects of the claim are solid and the balance of convenience clearly tilts in favor of John Doe, since Richard Roe is committing a continuing tort that harms John Doe’s assets and livelihood without any legal justification.

The document was prepared by Cantor Co. Law Firm and Notaries.